





















We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This allows us to test various 
models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and rational behavior. Our 
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1. Introduction 
Economic theory traditionally assumes that agents only care about their own material well being. 
This has frequently been criticized, based on notions of fairness and/or reciprocity (for a survey, see 
Fehr and Schmidt, forthcoming). Much of this research has used public-good contribution games. We 
experimentally study both fairness and reciprocity in a simple simultaneous-move surplus-division 
game: the Hawk-Dove game. We test for the occurrence of both positive and negative reciprocity. To 
do so, we elicit conditional strategies using the Becker-deGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism. 
There are two approaches to fairness and reciprocity in the literature. The 'outcome-approach' 
assumes that people are concerned about the final distribution of income between themselves and 
fellow players (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). In this view, a player 
may take costly actions to bring about a more equal income distribution. The 'process-approach' 
focuses on players' attitudes towards the process yielding the distribution of incomes (e.g., Rabin, 
1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998, Falk and Fischbacher, 1999, Charness and Rabin 2001).  
Actions are evaluated on the basis of what the player could alternatively have done (but did not do). 
For our game a player is predicted to behave the same way, irrespective of whether fairness 
or reciprocity is the driving force or whether preferences are outcome- or process-oriented. 
Moreover, his behavior and preferences will be different from those of a player with no other 
regarding preferences. Our main result is that most subjects revealed self-interested preferences and 
behaved in a money-maximizing manner.  
 
2. The Dove-Hawk game 
The extensive form of the game considered is given in Figure 1.  Two players have to divide a pie of 
size one (Poulsen, 2001). Decisions are simultaneous: if both play action D (Dove), the pie is split 
equally. If one player plays D and the other H (Hawk), the pie is split unequally, with the hawk-
player taking three quarters. Finally, if both play H (i.e., disagreement) neither gets a share and 
payoffs are zero.  
If the players only care about material payoffs, the game has two asymmetric Nash equilibria 
in pure strategies, (D,H) and (H,D), with an unequal split, and a mixed strategy equilibrium in which 
each player mixes between D and H with equal probabilities.  
We distinguish the following player types: 
♦  M: Materialist: plays H(D) if the partner plays D(H). 
♦  H: Hawk: plays H as a dominant strategy. Hawk responds to ‘H’ with ‘H’, which can be 
interpreted as negative reciprocity.  
♦  D: Dove: plays D as a dominant strategy. Dove responds to ‘D’ with ‘D’, which can be 
interpreted as positive reciprocity. 
♦  R: Reciprocator: responds to D (H) with D (H).   2
Figure 1: The Hawk-Dove Game* 
 
*mat=material payoffs; F/S: Fehr-Schmidt payoffs; B/O: Bolton-Ockenfels payoffs. 
 
One way to include a notion of fairness or reciprocity into the game is by using Fehr and Schmidt's 
(1999) model, in which inequity averse players dislike inequality. The utility function of player 
i={1,2} is: 
Ui(xi,xj)=xi-αi max[xj-xi,0]-βi max[xi-xj,0], αi≥βi, βi∈[0,1)   (1) 
where xi (xj) denotes the payoff to player i (j), i,j={1,2}, i≠j. A difference in payoffs decreases utility, 
the disutility being relatively greater if disadvantageous (xi<xj) than if advantageous (xi>xj).
1 The 
(utility) payoffs of the Hawk-Dove game with Fehr/Schmidt preferences are given in figure 1. The 
model accounts for three of the player types distinguished above. For α,β<0.5, the M-type emerges; 
α>0.5, β<0.5 gives the H-type and  α>β>0.5 yields the R-type.
2 The equilibrium of the game now 
depends on the types playing it, and the information players have about the other’s type. For 
example, for a game between a R and D [H], who know each other’s type, (D,D) [(H,H)] is the 
unique pure strategy equilibrium.  
Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) alternative model posits a utility function where i’s utility 
depends on his share of the pie, σi. An ‘unfair’ share is evaluated negatively:  
[]
2 2 / 1 ) 2 / 1 ( ) , ( − − = i i i i i i i b x a x U σ σ , αi > 0, βi > 0.         (2) 
The corresponding payoffs in the Hawk-Dove game are shown in figure 1. For ai > 8bi, the 
preferences are of the M-type; 0<ai<8bi, yields an R-type. H- and D-types are not predicted by the 
model.  
Both Fehr/Schmidt and Bolton/Ockenfels adopt the outcome-approach to fairness and 
reciprocity. As for the process- approache, precise predictions are quite involved due to the general 
                                                           
1 Fehr and Schmidt exclude altruistic preferences, i.e., αi<βi.  
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structure of these models. They generally support the R-type, however: individuals who perceive H 
(D) as a hostile (friendly) action will respond to it with H (D). Hence, both approaches work in the 
same direction in this game. Specifically, all models can account for the existence of R-types. This 
makes the Hawk-Dove game an ideal candidate for the purpose of studying the role of reciprocity 
without needing to choose a particular model of it. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
94 students participated in a computerized experiment
3 in June 2001 at the ‘ESSE’ laboratory at the 
University of Bari. Students were mainly Economics undergraduates. Experiments lasted 35 minutes 
and average payoff was 10,000 ITL (≈€5). The pie to be divided was 20,000 ITL.  
The experiment consisted of three stages. First, subjects were asked to submit any number 
between 0 and 100, corresponding to the probability of playing H.
4 Second, subjects were informed 
that their action determined in stage 1 was their initial action. They were then asked to submit a 
conditional strategy (numbers between 0 and 100) dependent on the action of the partner. Payoffs 
were determined as follows. One of the players in each pair was randomly chosen. Her initial action 
was recorded, after which her partner’s response was derived from his conditional strategy. Next, the 
first player’s response to this response was determined on the basis of her conditional strategy. 200 
iterations were conducted in this way. If the number of D-responses exceeded the number of H-
responses the final action of the subject was D, otherwise it was H. In case of an equal number (50 
each) of D and H, the final action was determined randomly.
5 Finally, in stage 3 subjects were asked 
to rank the possible outcomes (D,D),(D,H),(H,D) and (H,H) according to their preferences. No 
salient rewards were connected to this choice. Therefore, we will refer to this choice as the subjects’ 
stated preferences while we refer to the second stage choice as revealed preferences. 
 
4. Experimental Results 
Stage 1 
5 participants (5%) submitted a 50-50 mix of D and H (the mixed strategy equilibrium). Most 
submitted a pure strategy: 41 (44%) submitted D and 24 (26%) submitted H. 24 subjects (26%) 
submitted a different mixed strategy than 50-50. A two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test rejects the 
hypothesis that subjects mix D and H with equal probabilities: D is played significantly more 
frequently than H (p=.043).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
2 The intermediate cases where α=1/2 and/or β=1/2 are straightforward cases of indifference. 
3 Programmed with Urs Fischbacher’s Z-Tree. 
4 A random draw, y ∈{1,.., 100} determined whether their action was D or H: let x be the number submitted. If 
x<y (y≤x) the subject’s action was D(H).   4
Stage 2 
Figure 2 gives the conditional strategies submitted.  
 
Figure 2: Conditional Strategies 
 
*The numbers bars) indicate the fraction of subjects choosing strategy ‘0’, [1,49], 50, [51,99], 100. 
 
54% of the subjects responded to D with H (chose ‘100’). 73% chose D in response to H. In both 
cases, Wilcoxon tests reject the null-hypothesis of equal likelihood of playing H or D. Using the 
conditional strategies, subjects can be classified into the types distinguished above.
6 53% are 
classified as M-types, 30% as D; 6% as H and 5% as R. We could not classify the remaining subjects 
(5%) because they chose to play D and H with equal probability. Note that 83% reply to H with D. 
Furthermore, 70% of our observations can find support in the Fehr/Schmidt model (which excludes 
the possibility of D-types) and 64% can be explained by Bolton/Ockenfels (which does not allow for 
D or H types).  
 
Stage 3 
87% of the stated preferences were M-type, 11% were D and 2% were H. No R-type preferences 
were reported. Given that neither Fehr/Schmidt nor Bolton/Ockenfels supports D-types, these models 
do not explain the data better than the standard rational model. Finally, most subjects who did not 
choose a materialistic best reply behavior in stage 2 state their preference profile at stage 3 
inconsistently with their revealed preferences (most deviate by stating materialistic preferences).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
5 It was explained to subjects that a pure strategy choice (i.e., 0 or 100) would determine their responses and 
final action with certainty. 










cond. strat. given D 0.30 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.54
cond. strat. given H 0.73 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.06
0 <50 50 >50 100
   5
5. Conclusions 
The Hawk-Dove game enables us to measure reciprocity as defined in various models in one 
experimental set-up. Particularly, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) predict 
reciprocal behavior in the sense that a player should respond to H(D) by H(D). A majority of players 
in our experiments show materialistic preferences, however. The only other large group plays D in 
response to either move, implying a preference profile not predicted by either model. Though the 
response to D with D may be interpreted as positive reciprocity, the fact that these subjects also 
respond to H with D makes it hard to see their whole preference profile as reciprocal.  
One possible explanation for these results lies in the strategy-method used. Brandts and 
Charness (1998) found that experimental outcomes might vary substantially when playing ‘hot’ or 
‘cold’ (as here). Another possible explanation may lie in the fact that ‘cooperative’ play (D) does not 
bring about any Pareto-gains in the Hawk-Dove game. There were no incentives for subjects who 
wished to maximize group payoff to cooperate (contrary to the games by Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). 
These possible explanations are subject of future research.   6
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